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 Differences between Domestic Accounting Standards and IAS: Measurement, 
Determinants and Implications 
 
Abstract 
This study analyzes determinants and effects of differences between Domestic 
Accounting Standards (DAS) and International Accounting Standards (IAS).  Based on 
an extensive list of differences between DAS and IAS, we create two indices, “absence” 
and “divergence.” “Absence” measures the difference between DAS and IAS as the 
extent to which the rules regarding certain accounting issues are missing in DAS while 
covered in IAS.  “Divergence” represents the differences between DAS and IAS as the 
extent to which the rules regarding the same accounting issue differ in DAS and IAS. 
Using a sample of 30 countries for the year 2001, we show that “absence” is mainly 
determined by the importance of the equity market and ownership concentration, while 
“divergence” is positively associated with the level of economic development and the 
importance of the accounting profession and constrained by the importance of equity 
markets.  Our analysis also suggests that a higher level of “absence” implies more 
opportunities for earnings management and decreases firm-specific information to 
investors.  A larger “divergence” from IAS is associated with richer firm-specific 
information to the capital markets. 
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Cette étude analyse les déterminants et les effets des différences entre les normes 
comptables locales (NCL) et les normes comptables internationales (NCI). Sur la base 
d’une liste détaillée de différences entre NCL et NCI, nous créons deux indices  : 
l’« absence » et la « divergence ». L’« absence » mesure la différence entre NCL et NCI 
lorsque certains thèmes comptables ne sont pas présents dans les NCL tandis qu’ils sont 
traités dans les NCI. La « divergence » représente la différence entre NCL et NCI lorsque 
les règles concernant le même problème comptable diffèrent entre NCL et NCI. Nous 
utilisons un échantillon de 30 pays pour l’année 2001 et nous montrons que l’« absence » 
est principalement déterminée par l’importance des marchés de capitaux et la 
concentration de l’actionnariat, tandis que la « divergence » est positivement associée au 
niveau de développement économique et à l’importance de la profession comptable mais 
est contrainte par l’importance des marchés de capitaux. Notre analyse suggère également 
qu’un haut niveau d’«  absence  » offre davantage d’opportunités pour la gestion des 
résultats et diminue l’information spécifique sur les entreprises disponible pour les 
investisseurs. Une plus grande «  divergence  » par rapport aux NCI est liée à une 




Différences comptables internationales; facteurs institutionnels; gestion du résultat; 
synchronicité. 
   1. Introduction 
Accounting standards differ across countries. A commonly held belief is that such 
differences reduce the quality and the relevance of accounting information.  Accounting 
standards are important determinants of financial reporting quality, which provides 
independently verified information about a firm’s financial performance to investors, 
creditors, and other users of financial statements.  Proponents of harmonized international 
standards claim that if all firms follow the same set of accounting standards, firms’ 
external financial reports would provide more uniform disclosures and more useful 
accounting information to investors (e.g., Purvis et al., 1991).  The recent efforts towards 
harmonization (also called “convergence”) of accounting standards across countries and 
adoption of a uniform set of International Accounting Standards (IAS) have received 
considerable attention from investors, regulators, and academics worldwide.
1  P r i o r  
research provides evidence that complex institutional factors (legal, governance, financial, 
economic, and professional development) influence the financial reporting quality (e.g., 
Ball, 2001).  The purpose of our study is two-fold.  First, we investigate the impact of 
cross-country variations in the institutional framework on the differences between 
domestic accounting standards (DAS) and International Accounting Standards (IAS), 
measured both as “absence” of DAS and “divergence” of DAS from IAS.  Second, we 
explore the implications of these differences on financial reporting quality. 
Adoption of IAS has been controversial and much debated, especially until recent 
years (Flower, 1997; Zeff, 1998). Nonetheless, the mandatory adoption of IAS (or 
International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS) by the European Union
2 (and other 
jurisdictions including Australia and Russia) and the issuance of a memorandum of 
understanding between the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) which formalizes their commitment 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we refer to these standards as International Accounting Standards (IAS) because our 
research is based on accounting standards promulgated by the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) before the transformation into the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
and introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
2 Publicly listed EU companies must apply IAS/IFRS from fiscal year 2005. 
  1towards harmonization of US GAAP and IAS, have clearly paved the way for acceptance 
of IAS in many parts of the world.  However, accounting institutions exist in a mosaic of 
complex sets of institutional frameworks rather than in isolation.  Changing one piece of 
the mosaic may or may not be the optimal solution if other institutions stay unchanged 
(e.g., Ball, 2001; Hope, 2003a).  Therefore, it is important to consider the influence of 
institutional frameworks on the differences between DAS and IAS when we investigate 
implications of such differences on the financial reporting quality. 
Prior studies and surveys (e.g., Price Waterhouse International, 1973, 1975, 1979; 
Ordelheide and Semler, 1995) often interpret international accounting differences as 
different options adopted by different nations to address the same accounting issue.  Such 
interpretation matches the concept of “divergence” we use in this paper (explained in 
Section 2).  Few studies, however, have examined the comprehensiveness of a given set 
of accounting standards in comparison with another set of standards, which corresponds 
to the concept of “absence” in this study. 
Our aim is to analyze international accounting differences by developing a more 
refined measure of differences between DAS and IAS.  Our primary source for 
accounting differences is “GAAP 2001: A Survey of National Accounting Rules 
Benchmarked against International Accounting Standards,” by Andersen, BDO, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Nobes, 2001).  The year 2001 is a good observation point to 
understand the impact of institutional factors on the differences between DAS and IAS, 
because these differences are observed before the use of international accounting 
standards was mandated by major jurisdictions. 
Based upon this survey of partners in large audit firms from more than 60 countries, 
we construct a comprehensive list of items to develop the measures used in this paper – 
“absence” and “divergence.”  “Absence” measures the differences between DAS and IAS 
as the extent to which the rules regarding certain accounting issues are missing in DAS 
while covered in IAS. “Divergence” measures the difference between DAS and IAS as 
the extent to which the rules regarding the same accounting issue differ in DAS and IAS. 
We discuss our measures in detail in Section 2. 
  2Using a sample of 30 countries for the year 2001, we investigate the role of five 
institutional factors as potential determinants of the differences between DAS and IAS 
(i.e., “absence” and “divergence”): legal origin, ownership concentration proxying for 
governance structure, economic development, importance of the accounting profession, 
and importance of the equity market.  Our evidence suggests that the importance of 
equity market is negatively related to the “absence” of DAS.  There is a positive 
association between ownership concentration and “absence.”  In regard to “divergence,” 
we find a significant positive relation between the level of economic development and the 
importance of the accounting profession and “divergence,” and a negative association 
between the importance of equity market and “divergence.”  Our results are consistent 
with Ball (2001) who argues that the mere changing of accounting standards without 
corresponding improvement in capital market regulations/development may not yield 
desired results in financial reporting quality.  Our study also provides evidence consistent 
with the notion that a more economically developed country is more likely to be 
confident to adopt accounting options “divergent” from IAS. Furthermore, a nation with a 
highly developed equity market tends to adopt standards similar to IAS, which is 
consistent with the idea that IAS are developed primarily for publicly traded firms. 
We explore two implications of the differences between DAS and IAS: (1) on 
earnings management and (2) on synchronicity of stock prices.  Our main findings 
indicate that “absence” creates an opportunity for more earnings management and 
exacerbates the synchronicity of stock prices. Greater synchronicity implies that the 
idiosyncratic component of the changes in prices is small, thus stock prices are mainly 
affected by market-wide stock price swings. This result is consistent with the theory 
developed by Jin and Myers (2004), who find that lack of transparency (opaqueness) 
leads to a high level of synchronicity.  We also find that “divergence” between DAS and 
IAS has no effect on earnings management and is negatively related to the synchronicity 
of stock prices.   
Our paper makes three contributions to the accounting literature.  First, based upon a 
survey published by major accounting firms, we construct an innovative measure of 
  3international accounting differences which measures the differences in two dimensions – 
“absence” and “divergence.”  
Second, our study investigates the complex relation between institutional factors and 
the differences between DAS and IAS (i.e., “absence” and “divergence”). International 
harmonization (or convergence) of accounting standards is not necessarily a desirable 
goal because country-specific GAAP evolves in a political process balancing country-
specific economic environments, users, and objectives (Ball, 2001).  Our study is a first 
step towards better understanding whether institutional factors and accounting standards 
are substitutes or complements. Our determinant analysis implies that simply adopting 
IAS does not necessarily improve national accounting systems unless countries do more 
work such as implementing profound changes in economic development policy, corporate 
governance mechanism and financial market functioning in general.  This evidence is 
consistent with Ball, Robin and Wu’s (2003) study on earnings quality in four Asian 
countries. 
Third, by exploring the implications of variations in “absence” and “divergence” on 
financial reporting quality, our study indirectly highlights the pros and cons of adopting a 
uniform set of IAS worldwide. While a high degree of “absence” harms the financial 
reporting quality, our study provides evidence that “divergence” from IAS has no impact 
on the financial reporting quality.  To a certain extent, “divergence” enables information 
preparers to disclose more firm-based information. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and describes our unique measures. Section 3 presents the study of determinants of 
“absence” and “divergence” while Section 4 describes the results for the implications of 
the same measures. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
2.  Measurement of differences between IAS and DAS 
2.1. Literature on international accounting differences 
Various data sources have been used to measure international accounting differences 
in prior literature. Most of the prior studies interpret international accounting differences 
  4as different options adopted by different nations for the same accounting issues, which 
corresponds to our “divergence” concept. 
During the 1970s, Price Waterhouse International (1973; 1975; 1979) published a 
series of studies on accounting principles and reporting practices worldwide. These 
surveys have been used in several international accounting studies (e.g. Frank, 1979; Nair 
and Frank, 1980, 1981; McKinnon and Janell, 1984; Doupnik and Taylor, 1985). 
After summarizing the information on accounting practices in 15 countries (European 
countries, the U.S., Canada, Australia and Japan) plus IAS, Ordelheide and Semler (1995) 
proposed the TRANSACC Reference Matrix. They provide a comprehensive 
examination of different accounting methods, but it is restricted to the most developed 
countries in the world. Several subsequent studies have used this matrix to classify 
countries according to their accounting differences (e.g. d'Arcy, 2001). 
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) seek to determine whether the variation in accounting 
standards across national boundaries relative to IAS has an impact on financial analysts’ 
ability to forecast non-U.S. firms’ earnings accurately. They analyze accounting practices 
in 13 countries to identify differences in countries’ accounting standards relative to IAS, 
covering both differences in disclosure requirements and measurement methods for IAS 
versus sample firms’ domestic GAAP in 1993. Besides the article by Ashbaugh and 
Pincus (2001), few extant studies examine the comprehensiveness of a given set of 
accounting standards in comparison with others.
3 There should thus be ample room for 
improvement in the existing measurements for international accounting differences. 
2.2. Framework of analysis 
Prior studies have established some links between differences in accounting 
standards across countries (usually defined similarly to our “divergence” concept) and 
financial reporting quality (e.g., Alford et al., 1993; Joos and Lang, 1994; Auer, 1996) 
(see Figure 1).  In a widely cited study, Alford et al. (1993) find that differences in 
countries’ accounting standards affect the informativeness of reported financial 
                                                 
3 Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) examine links between corporate transparency and several 
corporate governance variables using an international sample.  
  5information.  The effect of institutional factors on the financial reporting quality has also 
been studied (see Figure 1).  Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) operationalize financial 
reporting quality as timely incorporation of economic losses and find that it is misleading 
to classify countries by accounting standards, ignoring reporting incentives, as is common 
in some international accounting textbooks,  transparency indexes, and IAS advocacy.  
They argue that financial reporting quality is sensitive to the incentives of both managers 
and auditors. Such incentives are in turn highly influenced by the interplay between 
market and political forces in the reporting jurisdiction.  In the present study, we examine 
the same general issues while investigating the interrelations between institutional factors 
and differences in accounting standards.  We further explore the implications of these 
differences (i.e., “absence” and “divergence”) on the financial reporting quality.  The 
dotted lines in Figure 1 delineate our approach to studying the indirect impact of 
institutional factors on the financial reporting quality. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
We extend this general framework by focusing on both “absence” and “divergence” 
from IAS (see Figure 2). 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Below is a detailed description of our unique measures of differences - “absence” and 
“divergence.” 
We study both the determinants of international accounting differences (“absence” 
and “divergence”) and on the implications of these differences. We consider the 
following institutional determinants of accounting differences: legal origin, governance 
structure (or ownership concentration), economic development, accounting profession 
development, and importance of the equity market. 
In order to study the implications of international accounting differences, we 
investigate both the financial reporting quality (see section 4) measured as the level of 
earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003) and the richness of the firm’s information 
environment (see section 5) measured as the synchronicity of stock prices (see Morck et 
al., 2000). 
  62.3. Measurement of “absence” and “divergence” 
One of the contributions of this study is that we construct a unique and elaborate 
measure of differences between national GAAP and IAS based on the survey “GAAP 
2001: A Survey of National Accounting Rules Benchmarked against International 
Accounting Standards.” This survey was published jointly by seven large audit firms: 
Andersen, BDO, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers.  In this survey, “partners in the large audit firms in more 
than 60 countries [62 countries, to be precise] were asked to benchmark their local 
written requirements against some 80 accounting measures, focusing on standards (both 
IAS and national) in force for the financial reporting period ending December 31, 2001” 
(Nobes, 2001).
4 We believe that it is reasonable to use the year 2001 as an observation 
point to help understand the impact of institutional factors on the differences between 
DAS and IAS, because these observed differences occur at the last point in time prior to 
the mandated adoption of IAS in major jurisdictions. 
In the survey, “the resulting high-level summaries were prepared by identifying, for 
the selected accounting measures, those instances in which a country would not allow 
(because of inconsistent requirements) or would not require (because of missing or 
permissive requirements) the IAS treatment” (Nobes, 2001).  For each country, the 
accounting differences with IAS are listed in four categories:  
1. “Accounting may differ from what is required by IAS because of the absence of 
specific rules on recognition and measurement,”  
2. “No specific rules requiring disclosures,”  
3. “Inconsistencies between national and IAS rules that could lead to differences for 
many enterprises in certain areas,” and 
4. “In certain enterprises, these other issues could lead to differences from IAS.” 
Appendix A shows the results of the survey for one sample country: Japan. We faced 
several methodological issues. The results of the survey are “negatively” organized in the 
sense that the survey includes “absent” or “inconsistent” (i.e., “divergent”) items. Items 
                                                 
4 Street (2002) provides a summary of the GAAP 2001 survey.  
  7that are “in conformity” or “present” or “consistent” are not disclosed. Because it is 
essential to identify these items for the purposes of our study, we examined the Survey 
Questionnaire presented in “GAAP 2001” (p. 149-161) in detail. The questionnaire has 
79 questions. Appendix B presents the first and last questions as an illustration. The only 
way to identify the “in conformity” items is to take all the questions from the 
questionnaire and search for the related item and/or IAS paragraph in the survey’s results 
(see Appendix A). We then assumed that an item related to a question not covered in the 
results was an “in conformity” item. During this exercise we realized that the order of 
questions in the questionnaire and the order of items mentioned in the results were not 
always consistent. Additionally, some topics listed in the results did not correspond 
exactly to a question; for instance, some questions were split into two items. 
We therefore matched the questions and results country by country. We decided to 
create a comprehensive list of items, comprising all items found in both the results and 
the questions. We identified 111 items from the initial 79 questions in the questionnaire.  




A  Absence of specific rules on recognition and measurement 
B  No specific rules requiring disclosures 
C  Inconsistencies that could lead to differences for many enterprises 
D  Differences in some enterprises 
 
As we found that the distinction was not always clear-cut between categories C 
(differences for many enterprises) and D (differences in certain enterprises), we decided 
to merge these two categories.  We also merged A (absence of specific rules on 
recognition and measurement) and B (no specific rules requiring disclosures), because 
both categories refer to the absence of rules. 
Thus, we finally ended up with two unique measures which show that DAS may 
differ from IAS in two aspects: 
  81. “Absence” of specific rules on recognition, measurement and disclosure (which 
corresponds to A + B): a particular issue is covered only by IAS but not by DAS. 
2. “Divergence” (C + D): inconsistencies that could lead to differences for many or some 
enterprises. In other words, a particular accounting issue is covered by both, but the 
treatment required under DAS differs from that required under IAS. 
For each country, we compute the total of absent items, providing the “absence” 
score. The same process is applied to “divergence” items in order to obtain the 
“divergence” scores.
5  
Regarding our measure of “absence,” it is important to point out that our underlying 
assumption is that IAS cover a more comprehensive list of accounting issues than DAS in 
most of countries included in our study.  However, it is possible that in some countries 
with a highly developed accounting system, DAS cover certain accounting issues which 
are absent from IAS. For example, the requirements for goodwill impairment tests in 
SFAS 141 were not included in IAS in 2001 (FASB, 2001). Meanwhile, it is quite 
unlikely that a country would on one side develop its DAS on some advanced issues 
absent in IAS while on the other side leave some blanks on basic issues. Consequently, 
although our “absence” index cannot measure the superiority of DAS over IAS, we argue 
that a very weak score on “absence” objectively reflects the sophistication level of these 
countries’ accounting standards with respect to comprehensiveness of coverage. 
2.4. Sample 
We have accounting differences information on 62 countries.  However, our sample 
size is constrained by data availability and varies between 31 and 39 countries, depending 
                                                 
5 In disclosure studies, the weighting of each disclosure item is potentially important. In the reported 
results, the indexes have been determined assuming that each of the 111 items has an equal weight. This 
assumption is standard in the literature and is also based on the difficulty involved in defining a specific 
weight for each item. However, we have re-run all tests with alternative weighting schemes. We first group 
all items within a given IAS and determine “absence” and “divergence” indexes per IAS. For example, if a 
given IAS includes 10 items among the 111 studied, we compute for each country the number of “absent” 
and “divergent” items over 10. This determines a percentage of “absence” and “divergence” per IAS. We 
then compute a non-weighted average of these indexes on all the IAS, resulting in disclosure indices where 
all the IAS have the same weight. Untabulated results show that inferences are not affected by this 
alternative weighting scheme. 
  9on the regressions.  To enable the readers to compare more easily across tables, we have 
identified a common sample across all tests (N=30) and report primary results based on 
the common sample.  Results based on expanded sample are not displayed for the sake of 
simplicity but results (which are similar) are mentioned. 
Table 1, Panel A, details the sample and shows how “absence” and “divergence” 
scores are distributed across sample countries included in our multivariate tests. 
Countries are classified in a decreasing order of “absence” and “divergence.” Our sample 
captures a significant proportion of the world economy as it represents 66.2% of the total 
World GDP in 2001
6 with 30 countries
7. Our view is that until 2001, the differences 
between DAS and IAS in our sample countries reflected the natural development of 
accounting standards without mandated adoption of IAS (e.g., the European Union in 
2005). Countries (e.g., Kenya) adopting the entire set of IAS “wholesale” (i.e., adopting 
the entire set of IAS with limited prior standards in place) could be argued to represent 
“artificial conformity.” These countries are not included in our 30-country sample. In 
addition, Table 1, Panel A shows that there is no country with a zero score in 
“divergence.” Countries with a zero score in “absence” (the U.K. and Ireland), on the 
other hand, are obviously countries which do not fit with the concept of “artificial 
conformity.” 
Insert Table 1 about here 
On average, 18.27 items out of the 111 (16.45%) covered by IAS are absent from 
DAS. For 22.63 items (20.69% of the items) IAS and DAS prescribe different solutions. 
Median values are similar. As of 2001, in spite of the convergence of accounting 
standards, DAS and IAS differ on more than one third of the items (37.14% to be precise). 
Note that, for each measure, we observe a great variance across countries with values 
ranging from 0 to 40 for “absence” and from 1 to 38 for “divergence”.  
                                                 
6 Source: World Development Indicators database, online version, World Bank, GDP, PPP (current 
international $) (NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD).  
7 93.5% of the total World GDP in 2001 with 62 countries. 
 102.5. Validity and interest of the measures “absence” and “divergence” 
In Table 1, Panel B, we compute the Pearson correlation between “absence,” 
“divergence”, and existing measures already used in the literature. First, we find there is a 
low and insignificant correlation between these two measures in our 30-country sample 
(Pearson coefficient = 0.074, p-value = 0.698). We also find an insignificant correlation 
between “absence” and “divergence” in our 62-country [39-country] sample (Pearson 
coefficient = 0.059, p-value = 0.651) [Pearson coefficient = 0.099, p-value = 0.545]. 
Consequently, the absence of correlation between “absence” and “divergence” is not 
sample specific. This finding confirms that our constructs measure two different 
dimensions of the same phenomenon (differences between DAS and IAS). As a 
consequence, “absence” and “divergence” cannot be considered as substitutes or as 
complementary.
8  
Second, we compute the correlation coefficients between our two measures and other 
measures used in prior literature: 
-  the CIFAR Disclosure index: measure of the quantity of financial information in 
financial reports, an index created by examining and rating companies’ annual 
reports on their inclusion or omission of 85 items (Center for International Financial 
Analysis & Research - CIFAR, 1995). This index has been used extensively by prior 
accounting and finance research (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Morck et al., 2000; Hope, 
2003a).
9 
-  the Disclose index developed by Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) to capture differences 
in financial reporting standards across countries relative to IAS due to the differences 
in disclosure requirements (see also Ashbaugh, 2001). 
-  the Methods index developed by Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) to capture differences 
in financial reporting standards across countries relative to IAS due to the differences 
in measurement methods (see also Ashbaugh, 2001). 
                                                 
8 As anecdotal evidence, note that whereas Austria and the U.K. have similar scores of “divergence” 
(respectively, 36 and 35), Austria ranks high in “absence” (34) and the U.K. ranks low (0). 
9 Hope (2003a, Appendix) provides an in-depth discussion of and validity tests of the CIFAR scores. 
 11-  the Accrual index used by Hung (2001) and constructed by equally weighting 11 
accrual-related accounting standards for each country. This index measures the use of 
accrual accounting. 
We find that “absence” is negatively and significantly correlated with the CIFAR 
disclosure index and the accrual index. These findings are intuitive. IAS require a large 
number of disclosures. If these disclosures are not required in DAS this would increase 
the “absence” index and explain the negative correlation between “absence” and the 
CIFAR index. Similarly, accrual accounting implies the existence of specific accounting 
rules, which may explain the negative correlation between the “Accrual index” and 
“absence.” “Divergence” is positively and significantly correlated with the “Methods 
index” because both measures capture differences in measurement methods between 
DAS and IAS. Thus, the observed correlations seem intuitive and provide some comfort 
that our measures pick up what they are intended to. Our measures add to the literature in 
two aspects: (1) they are based on a larger sample of countries and (2) the correlations 
show that none of the past indexes is correlated with both our measures.  In addition, 
using both measures “absence” and “divergence” better describes accounting differences 
across countries. 
3.  Determinants of differences between IAS and DAS 
This research is exploratory in nature since there is little if any extant theory 
regarding the usefulness or importance of the “absence” and “divergence” measures of 
accounting standard differences.  However, we rely on existing literature and use 
economic and institutional rationales to identify possible determinants of “absence” and 
“divergence.”  Consequently, we do not formulate hypotheses per se for our institutional 
factors. As all the five potential determinants could (at least in theory) be related to both 
“absence” and “divergence,” we include all variables in our regressions for both 
“absence” and “divergence.”  
 123.1 Factors potentially associated with “absence” and “divergence” 
Legal origin 
There is abundant literature examining the links between international accounting 
differences and legal system. As early as 1967, Seidler (1967) studied this relation. He 
indicated that “the fundamental similarity in the results of the legalistic approach to the 
determination of accounting principles in civil law countries, such as Turkey and Italy, 
can be contrasted with the patterns found in common law countries such as England and 
the United States” (1967, p. 776).  Salter and Doupnik (1992) conduct an empirical study, 
and their results demonstrate a dichotomization of accounting systems correspondent to 
the Common law/Code law dichotomization of legal systems. 
What are the exact impacts of legal origin of a country on the development of its 
accounting standards? In previous literature, a country’s legal system is often used as a 
proxy for shareholder protection (Ball et al., 2000; Hung, 2001; Ball et al., 2003; Hope, 
2003a). Common law countries are likely to exhibit greater shareholder protection than 
code law countries because their public shareholders are more willing to provide funding 
to companies. Common law originated in England and was established chiefly by judges 
who resolved specific factual disputes. Code law (or civil law) originated in ancient 
Rome and was instituted as rules of conduct linked to concepts of justice and morality 
(Hung, 2001). Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) suggest that common laws are adapted to 
contracting in open, public markets, while code laws are appropriate for contracting 
between a small number of parties. Thus, in common law countries, such as the U.K. and 
the U.S., companies rely heavily on public shareholders and creditors as sources of 
capital. In contrast, in code law countries, such as France and Germany, companies 
typically rely on employees, managers, banks, and governments for financing. Evidence 
based on 49 countries find that common law (French civil law) countries generally have 
the strongest (weakest) investor legal protections, and German–Scandinavian civil law 
countries were in the middle (La Porta et al., 1998). 
Such fundamental difference in legal origin has an impact on the role played by 
accounting information.  In common law countries, firms deal with other parties such as 
 13investors at “arms length,” which generates demand for information on firm performance. 
In code law countries, there is a greater degree of insider owners, such as banks, who get 
their information directly from management (or may even participate in firm decision 
making through board membership) (Hope, 2003b). In this context, we could expect that 
the accounting standards are more developed in common law countries than in code law 
countries, therefore the “absence” index should be lower for common law countries.
10
Ownership concentration 
With developed markets and financial institutions, the ownership structure would be 
highly diversified, thus creating a great demand for high quality accounting information 
by the diversified stockholders. Similarly, standard setters and regulators in such 
countries respond to the demand for higher financial reporting quality by promulgating 
sophisticated accounting standards.  However, in countries where the ownership structure 
is highly concentrated, there would not be such a great market demand for high quality 
financial reporting. Obviously, this could affect the quantity and quality of the accounting 
standards in such countries.  Thus, we expect the extent of ownership concentration to 
have an impact on the sophistication of a country’s accounting standards, that is, on the 
“absence” level.  
Economic development 
Extant literature provides evidence that developed countries tend to be more 
confident of their own accounting standards and more reluctant to adopt accounting 
practices from others. For example, before 2005, despite the efforts made by the IASB, 
most of the countries that had adopted IAS were either developing or transitional 
economies (Walton et al., 2003, pp. 12-13).   
Cooke and Wallace (1990) show that the level of corporate financial disclosure 
regulation in many developed countries is more likely determined by internal factors, 
                                                 
10 Though the above discussion leads to a negative association between “absence” and common law legal 
system, it is possible to argue for a positive relation. That is, while the common law system is characterized 
by limited law texts complemented by court cases and their interpretations, the detailed laws of code law 
countries could also imply more comprehensive accounting standards (i.e., accounting standards that would 
cover more issues). We consider a negative relation more likely. 
 14whereas in many developing countries it is more likely determined by external factors. 
Internal variables include (1) the stage of economic development; (2) the implicit and 
explicit goals of society, such as whether accounting is meant to serve micro or macro 
purposes (in the case of micro purposes, whose interests, those of the investor [U.K., 
U.S.], creditor [Germany] or government [France] are uppermost); (3) the underlying 
legal rules (code [written] or common law [unwritten]); and (4) culture (whether there is 
a desire to avoid uncertainty (Hofstede, 1980)). External variables are those factors that 
are likely to make accounting regulators in a country ignore or give less emphasis to 
internal factors. A list of such factors includes (but is not limited to) colonial ties that can 
explain some transplantation of accounting standards, the impact of transnational 
corporations, the effect of regional economic communities, the internationalization of 
world trade and stock markets, membership and participation in the meetings of bodies 
that set international accounting standards, and international movements of accounting 
professionals and firms (Cooke and Wallace, 1990). 
A developing country that wants to attract foreign investors to its equity markets (or 
encourage its domestic companies to finance through foreign equity markets) is more 
likely to adopt IAS which have higher acceptance and recognition worldwide than its 
own DAS.
11 That is why we expect a positive relation between “divergence” and 
economic development level. But economic development could also be linked with 
“absence.”  In developing countries, due to relatively simpler economies, there may not 
be the need for accounting standards for certain complex economic transactions. 
Therefore, even though these countries may have adopted IAS they may only have done 
so selectively for areas relevant to them.  On the other hand, developed countries would 
have comprehensive standards on all areas even though they may be different from IAS. 
Thus, “absence” could also be associated with economic development. 
                                                 
11 By comparison, a U.S. firm trying to attract foreign investors is not under the same pressure to adopt 
some other GAAP since U.S. GAAP is generally recognized and accepted as high quality.  
 15Importance of the accounting profession 
We could expect that a less developed accounting profession, one that generally has 
less experience and is less knowledgeable regarding numerous and complex accounting 
issues, would be associated with the development of accounting standards that were not 
very sophisticated, i.e., more “absence.”  In other words, in countries with weak 
accounting profession, the comprehensiveness of accounting standards would be lower 
leading to higher “absence.”  On the other hand, a stronger, more developed accounting 
profession, which almost by definition has more experience with more accounting issues, 
is more likely to be associated with the development of more rigorous and sophisticated 
accounting standards. This would suggest less “absence” with regard to IAS. 
Importance of equity markets 
The philosophy of IAS is to establish a fully transparent and equity market friendly 
accounting system (Ball et al., 2000). As mentioned in the IASC Framework (IASC, 1989, 
§ 10), “as investors are providers of risk capital to the enterprise, the provision of 
financial statements that meet their needs will also meet most of the needs of other users 
that financial statements can satisfy.”  This focus suggests that the accounting rules of 
IAS should go in the same direction as those rules adopted by the countries with 
important equity markets.  For example, Ashbaugh (2001) finds that non-U.S. firms are 
more likely to disclose IAS financial information when they are raising additional capital 
via the issuance of equity shares (i.e., participating in seasoned equity offerings). These 
findings are consistent with the suggestion that non-U.S. firms voluntarily disclose IAS 
financial information in an attempt to lower the information asymmetry component of 
their costs of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).  We thus predict a negative relation 
between “divergence” and the importance of the country’s equity market. 
Meanwhile, we also expect a negative relation between “absence” and the importance 
of the country’s equity market, since the accounting regulation is put in place to satisfy 
the needs of information users. With highly developed equity market, the need for a 
sophisticated accounting system is also high, which leads to a low level of “absence.” 
Table 2 provides the details of these variables are measured. 
 16Insert Table 2 about here 
3.2. Research design 
As emphasized previously, this paper is exploratory in nature as the determinants of 
the accounting difference indices are open to alternative explanations.  In this context, we 
consider a stepwise regression approach to be appropriate. This methodology has been 
employed in extant accounting literature in similar settings where there are a number of 
possible independent variables and no coherent theory to guide the empirical tests (e.g., 
Raffournier, 1995; Beaver et al., 1997; Street and Bryant, 2000; Ittner et al., 2003). We 
thus use the two following OLS stepwise regressions.
12   
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3.3. Findings and interpretation of determinants of variations in “absence” and 
“divergence” 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3, Panel A, provides the descriptive statistics for dependent and independent 
variables of our sample countries. 
                                                 
12 In a stepwise regression, the independent variable that is most correlated with the dependent variable is 
introduced first in the model. Subsequently, the other exogenous variables are included one by one, on the 
basis of the partial correlation coefficients. A new variable is included in the model only when its t statistic 
is not smaller than a critical value (and the t statistics of the other variables that are already in the model do 
not diminish below that value after the inclusion of the new variable). We have used a critical value 
corresponding to a two-sided 10% significance level. 
 17Insert Table 3 about here 
In panel A, both dependent and independent variables exhibit variation around their 
mean values. This suggests that our 30-country sample covers a great variety of 
institutional, economic, and accounting settings.  
Univariate results 
Table 3, Panel B, reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between our two unique 
measures, “absence” and “divergence,” and the following country variables: legal 
tradition, ownership concentration, economic development, importance of the accounting 
profession, and importance of equity markets in a country.  
“Absence” and “divergence” are both significantly negatively correlated with 
common law legal tradition (at the 0.05 level). In addition, “absence” is significantly 
positively correlated with ownership concentration, and significantly negatively 
correlated with the importance of the accounting profession and the importance of equity 
market. “Divergence” is positively and significantly correlated with the economic 
development level of the country.
13 Our univariate tests suggest that the determinants of 
“absence” and “divergence” are, with the exception of legal tradition, quite different. 
However, univariate results should be interpreted cautiously as they do not control for 
other factors. Thus, we now turn to multivariate tests. 
Multivariate results 
Table 3, Panel C, reports results of stepwise regression analysis on the determinants 
of “absence” (Model 1) and “divergence” (Model 2). We first regress “absence” on the 
five institutional factors previously identified.  In the first model, two variables meet the 
threshold for model inclusion: the estimated coefficient on the importance of equity 
market is negative and significant (at the 0.05 level) and the coefficient on ownership 
                                                 
13 Consistent with prior research, legal tradition, importance of the accounting profession, and importance 
of equity market are all significantly positively correlated. For example, La Porta et al. (1997; 1998) show 
that common law countries are more market based than code law countries, which tend to rely more on 
bank financing.  
 18concentration is positive and significant (at the 0.05 level).
14 These results are consistent 
with the univariate findings. 
Our regression results suggest that the absence of accounting standards (compared 
with IAS) in a given country is not a random phenomenon.  Rather, it is associated with 
important elements of the institutional environment, that is, with the importance of equity 
market and with the nature of ownership structure.  Our results may also be interpreted as 
implying that if a nation with a low accounting development level adopts IAS, the 
supposed benefits from the adoption may not be realized until institutional factors are 
changed accordingly.  In other words, this study provides some evidence for the indirect 
impact of institutional factors on the financial reporting quality via its influence on the 
accounting standards, and thus provides supplementary evidence to Ball, Robin and Wu 
(2003).  
In Panel C, Model 2, we report results of regressing “divergence” on the five 
identified institutional factors.  The stepwise regression results document a negative and 
significant coefficient for the importance of equity market (at the 0.01 level), a positive 
and significant coefficient for the importance of the accounting profession (at the 0.10 
level) and the economic development (at the 0.01 level). These results are also consistent 
with the univariate findings reported above. Our regression analyses show that 
international accounting differences can be explained by country-specific factors.  In 
particular, variation in DAS from IAS is positively affected by economic development 
and the importance of the accounting profession and negatively affected by the capital 
market development in the country.
15
As additional tests (not reported) for both models, we exclude Anglo-American 
countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.), which were founding members 
of the IASC and are supposed to have played a major role in the development of the 
content of IAS. Our results remain robust after excluding these countries.  We also rerun 
the regressions with the maximum size samples (39 countries) and find similar results. 
                                                 
14 All reported significance levels are two-sided. T-values are based on White (1980). 
15 A standard caveat is that we establish statistical associations between our dependent and independent 
variables. Such association does not necessarily imply causality. 
 194.  Implications of differences between IAS and DAS 
4.1. Hypothesis  development 
Earnings management 
Since the “absence” index measures the development of a nation’s accounting 
standards, we expect a higher level of “absence” of IAS items to result in greater 
flexibility and opacity in firms’ accounting practices and disclosure levels. Consequently, 
we expect to observe a higher level of earnings management and thus lower financial 
reporting quality when “absence” is high.
16 Thus:
17
H1: “Absence” is positively associated with earnings management. 
We do not make any predictions about the relation between “divergence” and 
earnings management since “divergence” by itself does not imply whether DAS are 
superior or inferior to IAS. Therefore it is difficult to specify a priori whether 
“divergence” results in lower earnings management.   
Synchronicity 
Stock price synchronicity represents the degree to which stock prices in a country 
move together (Morck et al., 2000). Synchronicity arises when firm-specific information 
is not properly perceived and valued by the market.  As indicated by Roll (1988), the 
extent to which stocks move together depends on the relative amounts of firm-level and 
market-level information capitalized into stock prices.  Morck et al. (2000) find a 
negative relation between per capita GDP and stock price synchronicities.  They also 
show that stock returns are more synchronous in emerging economies than in developed 
economies.  Among developed economies, they find greater synchronicity in countries 
that provide poor protection of the property rights of minority shareholders.  We attempt 
to explain stock price synchronicity by using accounting standards, while controlling for 
other institutional factors. 
                                                 
16 Clearly, not all forms of “earnings management” may hurt investors. However, most extant literature 
suggests that on balance earnings management is associated with lower financial reporting quality. Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) provide an overview of the earnings management literature.  
17 Our hypotheses are stated in alternative form. 
 20Stock prices are more likely to move together in a country where there is less 
credible firm-specific information available for pricing individual stocks.  Thus, 
idiosyncratic factors influence the changes of stock prices to a lesser extent.  Jin and 
Myers (2004) show that information opaqueness affects the division of risk bearing 
between insiders and outside investors.  Their model predicts that “opaque” stocks are 
more likely to crash, that is, to deliver large negative returns. Crashes occur when insiders 
have to absorb too much firm-specific bad news and decide to “give up” (Jin and Myers, 
2004). Lack of transparency shifts firm-specific risk to insiders and reduces the amount 
of firm-specific risk absorbed by outside investors (Jin and Myers, 2004).  In the absence 
of firm-specific information, macroeconomic news is expected to influence stock prices 
considerably, therefore the level of synchronicity increases. Accounting opacity induces a 
low level of disclosure.  Lower quality accounting and disclosure implies a poorer firm-
specific information environment, which could lead to higher synchronicity in stock 
prices. Thus: 
H2: “Absence” is positively associated with synchronicity. 
The effect of “divergence” on synchronicity (i.e., the influence of DAS on 
synchronicity) is ambiguous.  First, it could be argued that the countries adopting more 
“divergent” standards are more economically developed countries because they are more 
confident with their unique accounting rules.  It could be that their unique accounting 
rules indeed are superior to IAS in dealing with the local business and legal issues. It also 
could be that their unique accounting rules have been used for a long time, making it 
difficult (at least in the short term) to switch to alternative rules. If we treat the countries 
with high “divergence” index as more developed countries (tested by Pearson correlation 
between country’s GDP and “divergence” score – see Table 3, Panel B), then according 
to the theory of Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), these countries should have low price 
synchronicity. That is, we expect to see a negative association between price 
synchronicity and the “divergence” index. Second, one can argue that national accounting 
standards setters would choose the options that fit best with the needs of local business 
and legal environments (i.e., the “diverging” rules of DAS from IAS are specifically 
designed to satisfy the domestic investors). This country-specific regulation approach 
 21might in turn encourage accounting information preparers to disclose more firm-specific 
information to local investors. Under this approach, we expect a lower synchronicity of 
stock prices in a country with higher “divergence.” Third, we can expect that the 
international accounting standard setting process targets the improvement of accounting 
information transparency and therefore helps firms better communicate with investors 
(IASC, 1989). In this context, any accounting standards diverging from IAS may 
represent a less transparent accounting mechanism and imply less efficient 
communications with investors. As a result, a set of accounting standards that has higher 
“divergence” score implies a lower level of firm-specific information. Consequently, we 
could expect a higher synchronicity of stock prices in a country with a higher 
“divergence” index. 
Given these possible implications of “divergence” on synchronicity, we assume no 
direction in our final hypothesis: 
H3: “Divergence” is associated with synchronicity of stock prices. 
4.2. Research design 
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As control variables for our earnings management test, we include two variables also 
used by Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki. (2003): (1) Investor protection is the anti-director 
rights index created by La Porta et al. (1998).  It is an aggregate measure of minority 
shareholder rights and ranges from zero to five. (2) Legal enforcement is developed by 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and is measured as the mean score across three legal 
variables used in La Porta et al. (1998): (i) the efficiency of the judicial system, (ii) an 
assessment of rule of law, and (iii) the corruption index. All three variables range from 
zero to ten.  
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As control variables for our stock price synchronicity test we use the independent 
variables in Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000): disclosure, economic development (explained 
above), logarithm of geographical size, variance in GDP growth, logarithm of number of 
listed stocks, industry Herfindahl index and country Herfindahl index. 
Table 4 provides the details of the computation of the earnings management and 
synchronicity variables.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
4.3. Empirical findings 
Earnings management 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 5, Panel A, provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables of our sample countries. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Univariate results 
Table 5, Panel B, reports Pearson correlation coefficients between earnings 
management and our two measures “absence” and “divergence” plus the two control 
variables investor protection and legal enforcement.  As expected, we find a positive and 
significant correlation between “absence” and earnings management (at the 0.01 level) 
and no evidence of association between “divergence” and earnings management. 
Multivariate results 
In Table 5, Panel C, we use the earnings management indicator developed by Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki (2003) as a proxy for financial reporting quality.  Model 1 includes 
 23“absence” and our two control variables investor protection and legal enforcement. 
Model 2 is a similar specification replacing “absence” with “divergence” and Model 3 
includes all measures.  
Consistent with H1, we find that earnings management is positively and significantly 
associated (at the 0.01 level) with “absence” (and not significantly related to 
“divergence”). A high “absence” score creates room for earnings management. This 
finding suggests that in an unsophisticated accounting regulation environment, companies 
tend to take advantage of the accounting discretion to manage earnings. 
Synchronicity 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 6, Panel A, provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables of our sample countries. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Univariate results 
Table 6, Panel B, displays correlation coefficients between synchronicity of stock 
prices and “absence” and “divergence.” We find a positive correlation between “absence” 
and synchronicity; however, this correlation is not significant at conventional levels. 
Untabulated results, however, show that the correlation is significant (at the 0.05 level) 
when using the maximum available sample of 34 countries. In addition, the significant 
correlations between “absence” and variables related to synchronicity (CIFAR disclosure 
index, good government index) suggest an emphasis on multivariate results.  We obtain a 
negative and significant correlation between “divergence” and the synchronicity index. 
Multivariate results 
In Table 6, Panel C, we measure financial reporting quality by the synchronicity 
measure developed by Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000).  We adopt their regression 
specification and add our two indicators of accounting differences.  We present three 
specifications of the model:
18
                                                 
18 We present these three specifications of equation 4 in order to better isolate the effect of our two 
variables of interest (“absence” and “divergence”) on synchronicity because (1) we show in section 2.5 that 
 24-  Model 1 which includes only our measures “absence” and “divergence”; 
-  Model 2 which adds the following control variables (based on Morck et al. 2000): 
CIFAR disclosure index, economic development, logarithm of geographical size, 
variance in GDP growth, logarithm of number of listed stocks, industry Herfindahl 
index and country Herfindahl index; 
-  Model 3 which further adds the “good government index”. 
 
Consistent with H3, our results show that synchronicity is significantly positively 
correlated with “absence” across all three regression specifications. This result is 
consistent with a low development of accounting standards, measured by “absence,” 
contributing to low firm-specific information that results in a high price synchronicity.  
Our results further show that higher “divergence” is related to lower synchronicity in all 
regressions.  In other words, in countries with greater “divergence,” stock prices move 
together less, consistent with the presence of more firm-specific information (Morck et al., 
2000).  This finding, which does not imply the “divergence” is “better” than 
“conformity,” is consistent with the belief that diverging from IAS might enable national 
standard setters to issue standards that best fit with their local legal and business 
environments.  
Our results for earnings management and synchronicity suggest that variations in 
accounting standards between domestic and international GAAP can have real economic 
consequences.  It is important for standard setters and regulators to keep such possible 
consequences in mind when moving to harmonized accounting standards worldwide (see 
also Ball, 2001; Ball et al., 2003). 
5. Conclusions 
Our study provides empirical evidence of links between financial reporting standards 
and the economic, financial, and governance institutions in a country.  An important 
contribution of this study is that we construct new and refined measures of international 
                                                                                                                                                   
“absence” and CIFAR disclosure index are correlated, (2) Table 6, panel B, suggests “good government 
index and “divergence” are correlated.  
 25accounting differences which have not been used in prior literature.  Our measures are 
two-dimensional – “absence” and “divergence.” Specific rules on recognition, 
measurement and disclosure may be “absent” compared with IAS. “Divergence” 
represents inconsistencies in national accounting rules regarding certain accounting issues 
with those of IAS.  
We show that the level of “absence” is higher in countries with less developed equity 
market and with a higher ownership concentration. “Divergence” between DAS and IAS 
is positively associated with the economic development and the strength of the 
accounting profession but is constrained by the importance of equity markets. Our results 
corroborate and complement those of extant research (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Hope, 2003a) 
and have important implications for the harmonization of the accounting standards. That 
is, accounting institutions do not exist in isolation but in a mosaic of complex sets of 
institutions.  Merely changing one link (i.e., accounting standards) may not be sufficient 
to substantially improve the financial reporting quality unless changes to the capital 
market development and legal environment are brought about simultaneously.  It raises 
an important issue: although the application of IAS is meant to achieve uniformity 
worldwide, it is possible that this desired uniformity may remain theoretical rather than 
real due to the lack of simultaneous changes of other accompanying institutions. The 
preparers of the GAAP 2001 survey are also conscious of this challenge: they argue that 
“convergence will require a joint effort of governments, stock market regulators, 
standards setters, preparers, users and the accounting profession” (Nobes, 2001, p. 2). 
In addition to investigating determinants of differences between domestic and 
international accounting standards, we also examine economic consequences of such 
differences. We find that a higher “absence” level is associated with more earnings 
management and a higher synchronicity of stock prices. This suggests that expanding the 
coverage of accounting issues by DAS is essential to improve transparency and to curb 
earnings management. 
Meanwhile, “divergence” of DAS from IAS is associated with low synchronicity (but 
is not significantly related to earnings management). This finding corresponds to the first 
possible interpretation of our final hypothesis: “divergence” from IAS is used by national 
 26standard-setting bodies to adapt their standards to their local legal and business 
environments.
 27Appendix A. Japan (Source: Nobes, 2001, p. 75) 
Japanese requirements are based on the Commercial Code, the standards of the Business Accounting 
Deliberation Council and statements of the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Because 
March year ends are the most common in Japan, this analysis is prepared based on Japanese standards 
which will be in force for accounting periods ending on 31 March 2002. 
 
Japanese accounting may differ from that required by IAS because of the absence of specific 
Japanese rules on recognition and measurement in the following areas: 
-  the classification of business combinations as acquisitions or unitings of interest   IAS 22.8  
-  the setting up of provisions in the context of business combinations accounted for 
as acquisitions  
IAS 22.31  
-  impairment of assets   IAS 36  
-  the discounting of provisions   IAS 37.45  
-  the recognition of lease incentives   SIC 15  
-  accounting for employee benefits other than severance indemnities.   IAS 19  
There are no specific rules requiring disclosures of:  
-  a primary statement of changes in equity   IAS 1.7  
-  the FIFO or current cost of inventories valued on the LIFO basis   IAS 2.36  
-  the fair values of investment properties   IAS 40.69  
-  discontinuing operations   IAS 35  
-  segment reporting of liabilities.   IAS 14.56  
There are inconsistencies between Japanese and IAS rules that could lead to differences for many 
enterprises in certain areas. Under Japanese rules:  
-  it is acceptable that overseas subsidiaries apply different accounting policies if 
they are appropriate under the requirements of the country of those subsidiaries 
IAS 27.21 
-  under a temporary regulation, land can be revalued, but the revaluation does not 
need to be kept up to date  
IAS 16.29  
-  pre-operating costs can be capitalized   IAS 38.57  
-  leases, except those which transfer ownership to the lessee, can be treated as 
operating leases  
IAS 17.12/28  
-  inventories can generally be valued at cost rather than at the lower of cost and net 
realizable value  
IAS 2.6  
-  inventory cost can include overheads in addition to those relating to production   IAS 2.6  
-  the completed contract method can be used for the recognition of revenues on 
construction contracts  
IAS 11.22  
-  some trading liabilities are measured at fair value, but the category is not clearly 
defined  
IAS 39.93  
-  provisions can be made on the basis of decisions by directors before an obligation 
arises  
IAS 37.14  
-  proposed dividends can be accrued in consolidated financial statements   IAS 10.11  
-  the discount rate for employee benefit obligations can be adjusted to take account 
of fluctuations within the previous five years  
IAS 19.78  
-  any past service cost of employee benefits is spread of the average service lives of 
active employees even if the cost is vested  
IAS 19.96  
-  the portion of a convertible debenture that is in substance equity is not normally 
accounted for as such  
IAS 32.23  
-  extraordinary items are defined more widely   IAS 8.6/12  
-  segment reporting does not use the primary/secondary basis.   IAS 14.26  
In certain enterprises, these other issues could lead to differences from IAS:  
-  it is possible, though unusual, for dissimilar subsidiaries to be excluded from 
consolidation if the consolidation of such subsidiaries would mislead stakeholders  
IAS 27.14  
-  there are no requirements concerning the translation of the financial statements of 
hyperinflationary subsidiaries.  
IAS 21.36  
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Appendix B. Survey Questionnaire (first and last questions) (Source: Nobes, 2001, p. 
149, 161) 
 
IAS Reference  National GAAP for 31 
December 2001 
Para   Extract from IAS Text     Question  
27.11   A parent which issues consolidated financial 
statements should consolidate all 
subsidiaries, foreign and domestic, other than 
those referred to in paragraph 13.  
1    When there are 
subsidiaries must 
consolidated accounts be 
prepared?  
(…) (…)  (…) (…) 
40.69e   In addition to the disclosure required by 
paragraph 66 of IAS 40, an enterprise that 
applies the cost model in paragraph 50 
should also disclose the fair value of 
investment property 
71    Is it a requirement to 
disclose the fair value of 
any investment property 
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 31Table 1: “Absence” and “divergence” 
 
Panel A Scores by country 
Country Absence  Country  Divergence 
Greece 40  Germany  38 
Austria 34  Italy  37 
Denmark 31  Austria  36 
Malaysia 30  United  Kingdom  35 
Thailand 29  France  34 
Portugal 29  Ireland  34 
Spain 28  Belgium  32 
Pakistan 27  Finland  31 
Italy 27  Spain  29 
Philippines 24  Greece  28 
Finland 22  Sweden  26 
Belgium 22  Canada  25 
Australia 22  Netherlands  25 
France 21  Taiwan  23 
Taiwan 19  United  States  23 
Japan 18  Japan  22 
India 18  Portugal  22 
Germany 18  Australia  21 
Korea, Rep.  15  Denmark  21 
Hong Kong, China  14  India  19 
Indonesia 12  Norway  17 
Sweden 10  Hong  Kong,  China  15 
Netherlands 10  Pakistan  14 
South Africa  7  Philippines  14 
Norway 7  Singapore  14 
United States  6  Malaysia  13 
Singapore 4  Indonesia  12 
Canada 4  Korea,  Rep.  11 
United Kingdom  0  Thailand  7 
Ireland 0  South  Africa  1 
Number of countries  30  Number of countries 30 
Average 18.3  Average  22.6 
 
 32Panel B Pearson correlations 
 Absence  Divergence
Divergence 0.0738 
p-values (0.698) 
N 30 30 
CIFAR disclosure index  -0.5876 -0.1165 
p-values (0.001) (0.563) 
N 27 27 
Disclose (Ashbaugh and Pincus)  -0.0975 0.2415 
p-values (0.763) (0.450) 
N 12 12 
Methods (Ashbaugh and Pincus)  0.3414 0.6922 
p-values (0.278) (0.013) 
N 12 12 
Accrual index (Hung)  -0.5427 -0.2078 
p-values (0.016) (0.393) 
N 19 19 
Two-sided p-values in parentheses 
 
 
“Absence” of specific rules on recognition, measurement and disclosure in DAS compared to IAS (= 
number of absent items per country out of 111)  
“Divergence” that is, inconsistencies that could lead to differences for many or some enterprises between 
DAS and IAS  (number of divergent items per country out of 111). 
Panel A is presented by decreasing order of “absence” and “divergence”.  
CIFAR disclosure index: measure of the quantity of financial information in financial reports, an index 
created by examining and rating companies’ annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 85 items 
(Center for International Financial Analysis & Research - CIFAR, 1995).  
Methods index: captures the differences in financial reporting standards across countries relative to IAS due 
to the differences in measurement methods (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001). 
Accrual index designed by equally weighting 11 accrual-related accounting standards for each country 
(Hung, 2001).  
 
 33Table 2: Determinants of “absence” and “divergence”: Measurement of institutional 
factors 
 
Variable Measurement  Source 
Legal 
tradition 
Legal tradition is a dummy variable, coded one if the 
country has a common law tradition and zero otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1998). 
Ownership 
concentration 
Ownership concentration is measured as the average 
percentage of common shares owned by the three largest 
shareholders in the 10 largest nonfinancial domestic 
firms. 
La Porta et al. (1998). 
Economic 
development 
Economic development is proxied by the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita, i.e., the GDP in US$ 
adjusted to purchasing power parity, divided by the 
country’s population.  
World Bank: World 
Development Indicators 






The development level of the accounting profession in 
each country is measured by the density of public 
accountants/auditors per 100,000 inhabitants.  
IFAC 2002 membership 
statistics in February 2003 
(www.ifac.org). 
Population data: U.S. Census 







The importance of the equity market index is measured 
as the mean rank across three variables used in La Porta 
et al. (1997): (1) the ratio of the aggregate stock market 
capitalization held by minority shareholders to gross 
national product, (2) the number of listed domestic firms 
relative to the population, and (3) the number of IPOs 
relative to the population. Each variable is ranked such 
that higher scores indicate greater importance of the 
stock market
19. 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 
(2003). 
 
                                                 
19 Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) have a sample of 31 countries. In some additional tests, we extend their 
sample by adding eight countries that are included in La Porta et al. (1997) and computing the measure of 
the importance of equity market following Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003).  
 34Table 3: “Absence” and “divergence” determinants 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics                 
N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Absence 30 18.27 10.61 0.00 10.00 18.50  27.00  40.00
Divergence 30 22.63 9.59 1.00 14.00 22.50  31.00  38.00
Legal tradition  30 0.40 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00  1.00
Ownership concentration  30 0.42 0.14 0.18 0.34 0.43  0.54  0.67
Economic development  30 9.73 0.82 7.58 9.44 10.15  10.22  10.50
Importance of the accounting profession 30 120.30 170.09 2.29 11.69 47.42  139.83  656.56
Importance of equity market  30 22.25 9.10 7.00 15.33 21.83  28.17  38.50
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations (30 countries)           
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1)  Absence       
(2)  Divergence  0.0738     
  p-values  (0.698)     
(3)  Legal  tradition  -0.3797 -0.3650    
  p-values  (0.039) (0.047)    
(4) Ownership concentration  0.4758 -0.0564 -0.1251     
 p-values  (0.008) (0.767) (0.510)     
(5) Economic development  -0.2209 0.5616 -0.2127 -0.2136     
 p-values  (0.241) (0.001) (0.259) (0.257)     
(6) Importance of the accounting profession  -0.4648 0.1905 0.5754 -0.2581  0.3864 
 p-values  (0.010) (0.313) (0.001) (0.169) (0.035)   
(7) Importance of equity market  -0.4877 -0.2211 0.6223 -0.3542  0.3760  0.6097
 p-values  (0.006) (0.240) (0.000) (0.055) (0.041) (0.000)
  Two-sided p-values in parentheses.     
 
Panel C: Regressions  Model 1 - Absence    Model 2 - Divergence 
  coef. p    coef. p 
Importance of equity market  -0.425 0.042  -0.728  0.000
Ownership concentration  26.589 0.034     
Importance of the accounting profession        0.019  0.068
Economic  development      8.032  0.000
Constant 16.566 0.028  -41.64  0.030
Number of observations  30    30  
F 6.696    11.698   
Prob>F 0.004    0.000   
Adjusted R-square  0.294    0.559  
 
Definition of variables:  
“Absence”: Our measure representing the absence of DAS compared to IAS. 
“Divergence”: Our measure representing the divergence between DAS and IAS. 
Other variables: see Table 2. 
 35Table 4: Implications of “absence” and “divergence”: measurement of variables 
 
Variable Measurement  Source 
Earnings 
management 
Aggregate earnings management score computed as the average rank 
across four measures, two based on discretion in earnings and two based 
on earnings smoothing. EM1 is the country’s median ratio of the firm-
level standard deviations of operating income and operating cash flow 
(both scaled by lagged total assets). Cash flow from operations is equal 
to operating income minus accruals, where accruals are calculated as: 
(∆total current assets – ∆cash) - (∆total current liabilities - ∆short-term 
debt - ∆taxes payable) - depreciation expense. EM2 is the country’s 
median Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the 
change in cash flow from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets). 
EM3 is the country’s median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and 
the absolute value of the cash flow from operations. EM4 is the number 
of “small profits” divided by the number of “small losses” for each 
country. A firm-year observation is classified as a small profit if net 
earnings (scaled by lagged total assets) are in the range [0, 0.01]. A firm-
year observation is classified as a small loss if net earnings (scaled by 
lagged total assets) are in the range [-0.01, 0]. 
Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki (2003). 
Investor protection  Anti-director rights index created by La Porta et al. (1998): aggregate 
measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges from zero to five. 
Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki (2003). 
Legal enforcement  Equals the mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. 
(1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of 
rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from 
zero to ten. 




Index which represents the degree to which stocks in a country move 
together. Stock prices are more likely to move together when there is 
less credible firm-specific information available for the pricing of 
individual stocks. 
Stock price synchronicity is calculated as the fraction of stocks that 

















Morck, Yeung and 
Yu (2000). 
Disclosure  Disclosure index: measure of the quantity of financial 
information in financial reports, an index created by examining 
and rating companies’ annual reports on their inclusion or 




In square kilometers. It represents country size  World Bank (2000). 
Variance in GDP 
growth 
To measure macroeconomic instability, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) 
use the variance of per capita GDP growth for each country, with per 
capita GDP measured in nominal U.S. dollars estimated from 1990 to 
1994. We apply the same measure for the period 1990-1999 as published 
by the World Bank (2000). 
Morck, Yeung and 
Yu (2000). 
Logarithm of number 
of listed stocks 
Because higher synchronicity might simply reflect fewer traded stocks, 
Morck et al. (2000) control for this effect by using the logarithm of the 
number of listed stocks.  
Morck, Yeung and 
Yu (2000). 
Herfindahl  Index  The Herfindahl Index measures the degree of concentration in an 
industry or in a country and is computed by squaring the market-share of 
the firms, and then summing those squares. Industry Herfindahl index of 
country j:  where   is the combined value of the 
sales of all country j firms in industry k as a percentage of those of all 
country j firms.  
∑ =
k j k j h H
2
, j k h ,




Measure of how well a country protects private property rights.  Morck,  Yeung  and 
Yu (2000). 
 36Table 5: Implications of “absence” and “divergence” on earnings management 
Panel  A:  Descriptive  statistics           
 N  Mean  S.D.  Min  0.25  Mdn  0.75  Max 
Earnings management (LNW)  30 15.82 7.80 2.00 7.00 18.05  21.50  28.30
Investor protection  30 3.23 1.41 0.00 2.00 3.00  4.00  5.00
Legal enforcement  30 7.86 2.12 2.90 6.80 8.80  9.50  10.00
 




Absence Divergence Investor 
protection 
Absence 0.6015     
p-values (0.000)     
Divergence 0.0984 0.0738   
p-values (0.605) (0.698)   
Investor protection  -0.5358 -0.4480 -0.3333 
p-values (0.002) (0.013) (0.072) 
Legal enforcement  -0.2619 -0.2639 0.5172 0.0203 
p-values (0.162) (0.159) (0.003) (0.915) 
Two-sided p-values in parentheses.   
 
Panel C: Regressions          
  pred  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  signs  coef. p coef. p coef. p 
Absence +  0.298 0.009    0.295  0.009
Divergence ?      0.068 0.639  0.037  0.777
Control variables           
Investor protection  -  -1.949 0.008 -2.784 0.001  -1.870  0.018
Legal enforcement  -  -0.545 0.364 -1.087 0.142  -0.637  0.366
Constant ?  20.963 0.006 31.826 0.000  20.636  0.010
Number  of  observations    30 30 30   
F    9.828 5.629 7.938   
Prob>F    0.000 0.004 0.000   
Adjusted  R-square    0.410 0.280 0.387   
P-values are two-sided and computed using the White (1980) correction. 
Definition of variables:  
“Absence”: Our measure representing the absence of DAS compared to IAS. 
“Divergence”: Our measure representing the divergence between DAS and IAS. 
Other variables: see Table 4. 
 
 37Table 6: Implications of “absence” and “divergence” on synchronicity 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics                 
N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max
Synchronicity index  30 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.15  0.19  0.43
Disclosure index  27 66.37 9.63 36.00 62.00 65.00  74.00  83.00
Economic development  30 9.73 0.82 7.58 9.44 10.15  10.22  10.50
Logarithm of geographical size  30 12.40 2.20 6.43 11.34 12.70  13.22  16.12
Variance in GDP growth  30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Log of number of listed stocks  30 5.80 1.07 4.25 4.93 5.69  6.22  8.89
Industry Herfindahl index  30 0.21 0.05 0.13 0.16 0.19  0.24  0.36
Country Herfindahl index  30 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05  0.08  0.17
Good government index  30 23.71 4.81 12.82 20.18 25.37  27.27  28.82
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations (30 countries – except 27 countries for Disclosure index) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
(1)  Synchronicity  index           
(2)  Absence  0.2789         
  p-values  (0.136)         
(3)  Divergence  -0.4055 0.0738        
  p-values  (0.026) (0.698)        
(4)  Disclosure  index  0.1269 -0.5876 -0.1165       
  p-values  (0.528) (0.001) (0.563)       
(5) Economic  development  -0.3627 -0.2209 0.5616 0.1991      
  p-values  (0.049) (0.241) (0.001) (0.320)      
(6)  Log of geographical size  -0.0409 -0.0186 -0.0177 0.1156 -0.2469         
  p-values  (0.830) (0.922) (0.926) (0.566) (0.188)     
(7)  Variance in GDP growth  0.4121 -0.0780 0.0485 0.1187 -0.0583 -0.1141    
 p-values  (0.024) (0.682) (0.799) (0.556) (0.760) (0.548)       
(8)  Log. number of listed stocks  0.0864 -0.2253 0.1415 0.2745 0.2238 0.2678 -0.0185      
 p-values  (0.650) (0.231) (0.456) (0.166) (0.234) (0.153) (0.923)      
(9) Industry  Herfindahl  index  0.0746 -0.3147 -0.2169 0.1407 0.0171 -0.4495 0.2952 -0.1854     
 p-values  (0.695) (0.090) (0.250) (0.484) (0.928) (0.013) (0.113) (0.327)     
(10) Country Herfindahl index  -0.3511 0.0444 0.1213 -0.2544 0.0359 -0.2470 -0.1837 -0.7016  0.1926   
 p-values  (0.057) (0.816) (0.523) (0.200) (0.851) (0.188) (0.331) (0.000) (0.308)   
(11) Good government index  -0.3698 -0.3275 0.5491 0.3228 0.9143 -0.2117 0.0945 0.2165 0.2124 0.0367
 p-values  (0.044) (0.077) (0.002) (0.101) 0.000 (0.261) (0.620) (0.250) (0.260) (0.847)
Two-sided p-values in parentheses. 
 
 38Panel  C:  Regressions           
  pred  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 signs  coef.  p  coef.  p  coef.  p 
Absence +  0.003 0.039 0.005 0.030 0.005  0.084 
Divergence ?  -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.005 -0.003  0.086 
Control variables          
Disclosure index        0.003 0.094 0.004  0.088 
Economic development        -0.031 0.307 0.007  0.884 
Logarithm of geographical size        -0.006 0.317 -0.004  0.476 
Variance in GDP growth        43.424 0.023 44.129  0.025 
Log. of number of listed stocks        0.028 0.062 0.024  0.053 
Industry Herfindahl index        -0.068 0.846 0.117  0.631 
Country Herfindahl index        0.088 0.866 0.006  0.989 
Good  government  index          -0.007  0.468 
Constant ?  0.204 0 0.123 0.721 -0.119  0.722 
Number of observations    30  27  27  
F   6.996  3.014  3.036   
Prob>F   0.003  0.013  0.011   
Adjusted R-square    0.206  0.433  0.417  
P-values are two-sided and computed using the White (1980) correction. 
“Absence”: Our measure representing the absence of DAS compared to IAS. 
“Divergence”: Our measure representing the divergence between DAS and IAS. 
Other variables: see Tables 2 and 4. 
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